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FEAR AND LOATHING IN THE CLASSROOM:
AIDS AND PUBLIC EDUCATION
INTRODUCTION
In 1981 the Centers for Disease Control' first identified the
pathological condition now known as acquired immune deficiency syn-
drome, or AIDS.' The number of cases reported in the United States has
since risen from the five diagnosed in 19811 to more than 26,000." It is like-
ly the incidence of AIDS will continue its geometric increase in the future,
barring any major breakthrough in treatment.
The CDC estimates that as many as 1.5 million people have been in-
fected with AIDS, and 20 percent to 30 percent of these individuals will
develop the disease by 1991.6 The CDC also estimates that in 1991 more
than 174,000 Americans will require hospitalization for AIDS, 54,000 will
die of the disease, and another 74,000 will contract the virus.7 Addi-
1. The Centers for Disease Control (CDC) is an arm of the Public Health Service. It is a federal
agency charged with protecting the nation's health by providing leadership and direction in the
prevention and control of diseases, and by responding to public health emergencies. See OFFICE
OF THE FED. REGISTER, THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT MANUAL 1984/85 273 (1984).
2. The Centers for Disease Control originally defined a case of AIDS to be "a reliably diagnosed
disease that is at least moderately indicative of an underlying cellular immunodeficiency in a per-
son who has had no known underlying cause of cellular immunodeficiency nor any other cause of
reduced resistance reported to be associated with that disease." Acquired Immune Deficiency
Syndrome (AIDS) Update-United States, 32 CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL: MORBIDITY AND
MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 310 (1983). This definition has since been modified by the CDC. Under
the original definition, which counted only severe manifestations of an HTLV-III infection for
national reporting purposes, the individual had to be afflicted with an opportunistic infection.
Under the modified definition, those not suffering from an opportunistic infection will be
counted as AIDS patients for national reporting purposes if they have one of seven other specific
disease conditions. Revision of the Case Definition of Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome for
National Reporting-United States, 34 CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL: MORBIDITY AND MOR-
TALITY WEEKLY REP. 373, 373-74 (1985).
3. Five practicing homosexual males in Los Angeles contracted and died of pneumocystis carinii, a
rare form of pneumonia caused by the presence of a protozoan parasite, due to the depressed
status of the victims' immune systems. Because the men had previously been healthy with normal
immunological systems, the CDC reasoned that the underlying cause of the reduction in their im-
munological defenses was acquired, not hereditary. See Pneumocystis Pneumonia-Los Angeles,
30 CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL: MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 250 (1981).
4. CDC Official TermsAIDS "Worldwide Disease", AIDS Policy & Law (BNA) No. 19, at 7 (Oct.
8, 1986).
5. Id. at 7; Citing "Staggering" Numbers of Cases, PHS Sets Strategy to Combat Epidemic, AIDS
Policy & Law (BNA) No. 11, at 1 (June 18, 1986). Since 1979, the incidence of AIDS has doubled
every six months. See U.C.L.A. Conference, The Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome, 99 AN-
NALS OF INTERNAL MED. 208, 216 (1983) [hereinafter cited as U.C.L.A. Conference]. Experts ex-
pect the spread of the disease to continue, with the number of cases doubling yearly. See Krim,
AIDS: The Challenge to Science and Medicine, HASTINGS CENTER REP. 5, 6 (Supp. Aug. 1984).
6. Citing "Staggering" Numbers of Cases, PHS Sets Strategy to Combat Epidemic, AIDS Policy &
Law (BNA) No. 11, at 1 (June 18, 1986).
7. CDC Official Terms AIDS "Worldwide Disease", AIDS Policy & Law (BNA) No. 19, at 7 (Oct.
8, 1986); Citing "Staggering" Numbers of Cases, PHS Sets Strategy to Combat Epidemic, AIDS
Policy & Law (BNA) No. 11, at 1 (June 18, 1986).
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tionally, by 1991 a total of 270,000 cases of AIDS will have developed,
resulting in 179,000 deaths.'
The justified public fear of the disease has given rise to some un-
justified public responses. Such responses include refusals by medical per-
sonnel to care for suspected and confirmed AIDS victims, the shunning
and firing of persons in the workplace, and the refusal or contemplated
refusal of school authorities to allow children with or suspected of having
AIDS to attend public schools. The latter situation raises questions as to
the legal standing of school-age children afflicted with AIDS, their
schoolmates and the public school system. A number of school districts
across the nation have taken on the delicate task of balancing the educa-
tional interests of AIDS victims against the health concerns of other
students, but a consensus as to which interest should control has yet to
emerge. 9
This note examines the conflict caused by the introduction of an AIDS-
infected child into a public classroom in a society that balances the rights
of the individual against the authority of a state to protect the health and
welfare of its residents. It outlines what is known about the disease and il-
lustrates the effect it has had on society and education. The note also ex-
plores the status of public education as a right, what the courts require
to justify curtailing access to public education, and the applicability of the
constitutional doctrines of equal protection and due process. Finally, the
note suggests that, public hysteria aside, legislation less drastic than man-
datory expulsion should be implemented to deal with the situation.
THE AIDS VIRUS
As its name suggests, the AIDS virus affects the victim by disabling the
body's natural immune system at the cellular level, greatly increasing the
individual's susceptibility to other diseases. The virus accomplishes this by
suppressing the number of T-4 lymphocytes, a type of white blood cell
essential to the proper response of the body's immune system to attacks by
infectious agents.'I Once this defense mechanism has been diminished, the
8. The CDC emphasizes that these figures are probably low by at least 20 percent due to failures in
detecting and reporting the disease, and to the fact that the CDC's national reporting system
statistics include only severe manifestations of the virus. See CDC Official Terms AIDS
"Worldwide Disease", AIDS Policy & Law (BNA) No. 19, at 7 (OCt. 8, 1986); Citing "Stagger-
ing" Numbers of Cases, PHS Sets Strategy to Combat Epidemic, AIDS Policy & Law (BNA) No.
11, at 1 (June 18, 1986); Update: Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome-United States, 35
CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL: MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 17, 17-18 (1986)
[hereinafter cited as Update].
9. See infra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
10. See Anderson, Children and AIDS: Implications for Child Welfare, 63 CHILD WELFARE 62, 63
(1984); Krim, supra note 5, at 2-4.
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body becomes susceptible to a number of rare opportunistic diseases that
would pose no significant health risk to a normal immune system."
The AIDS virus, designated as Human T-cell Lymphotropic Virus
Type III (HTLV-III), poses an especially difficult situation in that it is
transmissible, 2 currently beyond our ability to control 3 and deadly. The
AIDS mortality rate (proportion of deaths among reported cases) is fifty-
one percent, and the fatality rate (likelihood of an AIDS patient dying of
the disease), is 100o%.' Although temporary remissions are common, no
patient has fully recovered from the virus' effects.
Statistics show the number of AIDS cases is rising geometrically.' 5
Moreover, the Centers for Disease Control report that statistical estimates
may be deceptively low because of uncertainty and variability of the in-
cubation period of the virus, failures in reporting and detecting the
disease, and the stringent requirements of the CDC's definition of a case
of AIDS. 6 The incubation period typically ranges between six months and
two years but may take up to seven years."' Once infected, the victim
becomes a carrier and is able to transmit the virus.' 8
The fatality of AIDS and the absence of an effective treatment have
caused a great deal of justifiable public concern. The virus has also,
however, kindled fear and confusion regarding the ease and mode of its
transmission. The AIDS virus has been isolated in blood, semen, saliva,
11. These diseases are called "opportunistic" because they are found to occur only in individuals suf-
fering from severe immune deficiencies. See Krim, supra note 5, at 2. The most common of these
opportunistic infections are pneumocystis carinii pneumonia, a rare and highly fatal form of
pneumonia caused by a parasitic lung infection, and Kaposi's sarcoma, a rare form of skin cancer
that attacks the liver and lungs. Among AIDS patients, 6307o have been diagnosed as having
pneumocystis carinii pneumonia and 24% with Kaposi's sarcoma. Update, supra note 8, at
17-18. These diseases usually occur only when an individual's immune system has been artificially
suppressed by medications used in cancer therapy or organ transplants. See Anderson, supra note
10, at 63; Batchelor, AIDS: A Public Health and Psychological Emergency, 39 AM. PSYCH.,
1279, 1279-84 (Nov. 1984).
12. The virus is known to be transmissible through intimate sexual conduct, contaminated hypoder-
mic needles, contaminated blood or blood products, and in utero or at birth from a mother to
child. See Public Health Service Plan for the Prevention and Control of Acquired Immune Defi-
ciency Syndrome (AIDS), 100 PUB. HEALTH REP. 453 (1985). See also infra notes 19-26 and ac-
companying text.
13. "Although some of the opportunistic infections associated with AIDS can be treated or con-
trolled, there is no effective long-term treatment for life-threatening cancers or infections, and
no treatment at all for AIDS itself." See Batchelor, supra note 11, at 1279-84.
14. Eighty percent of those infected die within two years of diagnosis. The prognosis for the 20 per-
cent who do not die within two years is that they will die of the disease within five years of
diagnosis. See Krim, supra note 5, at 6; U.C.L.A. Conference, supra note 5, at 216; Update,
supra note 8, at 17-18; Batchelor, supra note 11, at 1279-84.
15. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
16. See supra notes 2 and 6 and accompanying text.
17. Studies report that 10 percent of the individuals testing positive for the virus develop AIDS
within two years, but the CDC has determined that the incubation period may range from one to
seven years. See Update, supra note 8, at 20; Public Health Service Plan for the Prevention and
Control of Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS), 100 PUB. HEALTH REP. 453 (1985);
Krim, supra note 5, at 5.
18. See Krim, supra note 5, at 5.
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tears, breast milk and urine, and it is likely to be isolated in other bodily
fluids, secretions and excretions.' 9 Only blood and semen, however, have
been implicated in the transmission of AIDS.2"
The CDC identifies the four known means of contracting the virus as
being (1) from an infected sexual partner through exchange of body fluids,
(2) through equipment used to administer intravenous drugs, (3) through
contaminated blood and blood products, and (4) from infected mothers to
infants at or before birth.' Where none of these factors exist, there ap-
pears to be no risk of transmission.22
There is no indication that the virus is transmissible through contact
with food, water, air or environmental surfaces handled by or located near
infected individuals, even in health care settings in which AIDS patients
are treated. 3 Additionally, CDC figures indicate that none of the family
members of more than 12,000 AIDS patients have contracted AIDS, other
than sexual partners of infected patients and infants born to infected
mothers.24
Due to the limited means of transmission, ninety-four percent of AIDS
victims in the United States fall into six groups that suggest a possible
means of disease acquisition: (1) sixty-five percent are homosexual or
bisexual men who are not intravenous drug users; (2) seventeen percent are
heterosexual intravenous drug users; (3) eight percent are homosexual or
bisexual men who are intravenous drug users; (4) two percent are reci-
19. See Recommendations for Preventing Transmission of Infection with Human T-Lymphotropic-
Virus Type IlI/Lymphadenopathy-Associated Virus in the Workplace, 34 CENTERS FOR DISEASE
CONTROL: MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 682 (1985) [hereinafter cited as Transmis-
sion in the Workplace]; Recommendations for Preventing Possible Transmission of Human
T-Lymphotropic Virus Type III/Lymphadenopathy Associated Virus from Tears, 34 CENTERS
FOR DISEASE CONTROL: MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 533 (1985).
20. Transmission in the Workplace, supra note 19, at 682; Batchelor, supra note 11, at 1279.
21. See Prevention of Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS): Report of Inter-Agency
Recommendations, 32 CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL: MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY
REP. 101 (1983); Public Health Service Plan for the Prevention and Control of Acquired Im-
mune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS), 100 PUB. HEALTH REP. 453 (1985); Krim, supra note 5, at 4;
U.C.L.A. Conference, supra note 5, at 216; AIDS: Casual Contact Exonerated, 128 Sci. NEWS
213 (1985); Batchelor, supra note 11, at 1279-84; Recommendations for Assisting in the Preven-
tion of Perinatal Transmission of Human T-Lymphotropic Virus Type Ill/Lymphadenopathy-
Associated Virus and Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome, 34 MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY
WEEKLY REP. 721 (1985) [hereinafter cited as Perinatal Transmission].
22. The virus "must be virtually injected into the bloodstream, and then encounter cells in which it
can multiply." Krim, supra note 5, at 4. Present research indicates the only cells in which this is
possible are activated T-4 lymphocytes, certain B lymphocytes, and cells of the central nervous
system. See id.
23. See U.C.L.A. Conference, supra note 5, at 216; Education and Foster Care of Children Infected
with Human T-Lymphotropic Virus Type Ill/Lymphadenopathy-Associated Virus, 34 CENTERS
FOR DISEASE CONTROL: MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 517, 518 (1985) [hereinafter
cited as Education and Foster Care].
24. See Education and Foster Care, supra note 23, at 518-19; Household Contact Found Low Risk,
AIDS Policy & Law (BNA) No. 15, at 6 (Aug. 13, 1986).
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pients of transfused blood or blood components;2" (5) one percent are
hemophiliacs; and (6) one percent are the heterosexual partners of persons
with AIDS or at risk for AIDS.2 6
Pediatric AIDS
Concern for and fear of the disease have resulted in disparate treatment
of AIDS victims and lawsuits in numerous situations, including employ-
ment discrimination. 7 Although discrimination is undesirable anywhere it
25. Infection via transfusion occurs when the recipient of a transfusion receives blood or blood pro-
ducts from a carrier of the AIDS virus. See Curran, Lawrence & Jaffe, Acquired Immunodefi-
ciency Syndrome (AIDS) Associated With Transfusions, 310 NEw ENG. J. MED. 69, at 69-75
(1984). Although the U.S. Public Health Service estimates the likelihood of such an occurrence
as one in I million, public fear of such contamination has caused the Public Health Service to
issue suggested guidelines for the collection of blood donations. These recommendations seek to
exclude from the donor pool members of groups with a high risk of carrying the AIDS virus. Ad-
ditionally, the use of tests for the virus in donated blood is advocated, although existing tests are
not 100 percent accurate. See Levine and Bayer, Screening Blood: Public Health and Medical
Uncertainty, HASTINGS CENTER REP. I, at 8 (Supp. Aug. 1984).
26. See Update, supra note 8, at 17-18. By considering these six groups in conjunction with
transmission in utero or at birth, all segments of the population become open to infection. See
Curran, Lawrence & Jaffe, supra note 25, at 69-75; Thomas, Jaffe, Spira, Reiss, Guerrero &
Auerbach, Unexplained Immunodeficiency in Children, 252 J. A.M.A. 639 (1984). Doctors have
detected the disease in all major racial and ethnic groups in the United States. Whites account for
60 percent of all adult cases, blacks 25 percent, and Hispanics 14 percent. Seven percent of all
cases have occurred in women. All age groups have been affected, although most victims fall in
the 25-44 age bracket. See Update supra note 8, at 17; Batchelor, supra note 11, at 1279-84.
27. Discrimination based on AIDS has arisen in numerous areas, including the armed forces
(discharge without benefits from Air Force based on AIDS being proof of misconduct), univer-
sities (refusal to rehire a professor with AIDS), media (television technicians refused to assist in
the taping of a program on which AIDS victims appeared), transportation industry (flight atten-
dant suspected of having AIDS fired), family situations (woman attempted to cut off ex-
husband's child visitation rights because she suspected he might have or contract AIDS), and
health care (medical personnel refusing to treat AIDS patients or enter their hospital rooms).
Thus far, suits arising from discrimination based on AIDS have been decided in favor of the
AIDS victim, usually in out-of-court settlements. See Batchelor, supra note 11, at 1283;
Volberding and Abrams, Clinical Care and Research in AIDS, HASTINGS CENTER REP. 16-17
(Supp. Aug. 1984); Comment, AIDS: A Legal Epidemic?, 17 AKRON L. REV. 717, 733-35
(1984).
Prisons have also presented a difficult situation in that experts recognize prisons as high risk
areas for the transmission of AIDS due to the high incidence of homosexuality and intravenous
drug use, in addition to the common denominators of age and sex. AIDS in Correctional
Facilities: A Report of the National Institute of Justice and the American Correctional Associa-
tion, 35 CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL: MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 195, 198-99
(1986). In La Rocca v. Dalscheim, 120 Misc. 2d 679, 702; 467 N.Y.S.2d 302, 306 (1983), inmates
of New York's Downstate Correctional Facility brought suit requesting an injunction be issued
forcing prison officials to halt all inmate and employee movement in and out of the prison until
both groups could be examined to ensure that the disease had not spread, and to move all in-
fected prisoners out of the prison to a hospital for treatment. The court declined to issue the re-
quested injunction, holding that the state authorities had adequately segregated the prisoners
with the virus in light of the medical evidence that casual contact posed no health risk. Id. at
702-11.
An emerging area of potential discrimination involves the health insurance field. On the
average, annual health care for an AIDS victim costs $140,000. With the number of cases in-
creasing geometrically, insurance industry lawyers estimate that the disease will cost the in-
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occurs, it is most tragic where AIDS victims have been infected through no
affirmative act or fault of their own, as is true of children with AIDS.2"
Cases of children with AIDS, often referred to as pediatric AIDS,29 ac-
count for one percent of all reported cases of the disease.3" The Centers
for Disease Control expect the number of children with the virus to double
yearly.3 Seventy-six percent of children with AIDS contracted the virus
from infected mothers, either in utero or at birth.32 Eighteen percent were
infected through transfusions33 with contaminated blood or blood pro-
ducts.3" Fifty-nine percent of infected children have died.35 In Centers for
Disease Control studies of nonsexual household contacts, no family
surance industry $150 billion over the next five years. Faced with this scenario, many health and
life insurers want to test insurance applicants to determine if the person has been exposed to the
virus. Currently, the insurance industry carries out such screening to determine if applicants
have fatal diseases or smoke; where a company finds such factors, they may set higher premiums
or deny coverage altogether. Insurance companies state that unless they can conduct such tests,
and those with AIDS or with a greater risk of contracting AIDS assessed with higher premiums,
all policyholders will bear the brunt of the increased costs. Additionally, some insurance com-
panies may exclude AIDS from coverage altogether if they cannot test for the virus.
Opponents of such testing point out that testing for AIDS differs from testing for heart disease
because the stigma attached with AIDS goes beyond the medical determination. A person might
never develop the disease, yet the knowledge that the person is a carrier could cause loss of
employment and social ostracism. Although confidentiality of medical records is the general
rule, where an infected party is insured through an employer, the medical records are open to in-
spection by that employer. Such concerns have prompted the California Legislature to ban AIDS
testing for insurance or employment purposes. Other states, however, have decided to allow such
testing. See Tarr, AIDS: The Legal Issues Widen, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 25, 1985, at 1, 28-29.
28. The general precept of not penalizing innocent children for circumstances over which they had
no control is supported, independent of other legal precepts, by the Supreme Court in Plyler v.
Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982). In Plyler, Texas withheld funds for the education of children illegally
within the United States. In striking down the statute, the Court indicated that it would not con-
done arbitrary penalization of children for the actions of their parents. The court stated that
"[elven if the State found it expedient to control the conduct of adults by acting against their
children, legislation directing the onus of a parent's misconduct against his children does not
comport with fundamental conceptions of justice." 457 U.S. at 220.
29. The CDC defines a case of "pediatric AIDS" as a child who has had: "1) A reliably diagnosed
disease at least moderately indicative of underlying cellular immunodeficiency, and 2) No known
cause of underlying cellular immunodeficiency or any other reduced resistance reported to be
associated with that disease." Education and Foster Care, supra note 23, at 518.
30. The CDC, however, feels this figure may be deceptively low. The 231 cases of pediatric AIDS
reported as of 1986 represented only the more severe manifestations of the virus, which medical
personnel are required to report to the board of health. Currently no such reporting requirement
exists for cases of AIDS-related complex (ARC), which encompasses the less severe manifesta-
tions of the AIDS virus. Of pediatric AIDS patients, 60 percent are black, 19 percent are white, and
20 percent are Hispanic; 55 percent are male. See Update, supra note 8, at 19; Education and
Foster Care, supra note 23, at 518-19.
31. See Education and Foster Care, supra note 23, at 518-19.
32. This 76 percent figure refers to the 231 pediatric AIDS cases reported to the CDC in children 13
years of age and under. See Update, supra note 8, at 17. See also Perinatal Transmission, supra
note 21, at 722; Education and Foster Care, supra note 23, at 518.
33. Contamination though transfusion accounts for one percent of the overall incidence of AIDS,
but accounts for 18 percent of the instances of pediatric AIDS. See Batchelor, supra note 11, at
1279-84; Perinatal Transmission, supra note 21, at 722; Education and Foster Care, supra note
23, at 518; Curran, Lawrence & Jaffe, supra note 25, at 70-74.
34. The remaining six percent were not investigated. See Perinatal Transmission, supra note 21, at
722.
35. See Update, supra note 8, at 11.
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member of an AIDS patient has contracted AIDS through casual
contact,36 nor have there been any detected instances of transmission in a
school or similar setting where casual, person-to-person contact with in-
fected individuals occurs.37
In light of such evidence, the Centers for Disease Control have recom-
mended guidelines regarding the care and education of children and in-
fants with AIDS.38 The guidelines advise that a case-by-case analysis be
used in deciding whether an infected child should attend regular classes,
with special consideration given to children who have a history of biting,
lack of control of their bodily secretions, or have uncoverable oozing le-
sions.39 The Centers for Disease Control emphasize that the benefits an in-
fected student receives from an unrestricted educational setting outweigh
the apparently nonexistent risk of transmission."' The National Education
Association, the nation's largest teachers union, has developed guidelines
that closely resemble those of the Centers for Disease Control, with the
additional suggestion that in cases where a child is excluded from the
classroom for good cause, alternative instruction should be provided."1
Although some school districts have adopted the Centers for Disease
36. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
37. See Education and Foster Care, supra note 23, at 518; Recommendations for Preventing Poss-
ible Transmission of Human T-Lymphotropic Virus Type Ill/Lymphadenopathy Associated
Virus from Tears, 34 CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL: MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REP.
533, 534 (1985); Krim, supra note 5, at 4.
38. See Education and Foster Care, supra note 23, at 519-20. The portions of the Centers for Disease
Control's recommended guidelines for the care and education of infected children most ap-
plicable to AIDS in the classroom are reprinted in the appendix to this note. The guidelines were
drafted by the CDC with the assistance of representatives from the Conference of State and Ter-
ritorial Epidemiologists, the Association of State and Territorial Health Officers, the National
Association of County Health Officers, the Division of Maternal and Child Health (Health
Resources and Services Administration), the National Association for Elementary School Prin-
cipals, the National Association of State School Nurse Consultants, the National Congress of
Parents and Teachers, the Children's Aid Society, and the parent of a child with AIDS. Education
and Foster Care, supra note 23, at 519-20.
39. See Appendix, provisions 2-3. The Centers for Disease Control and the American Academy of
Pediatrics emphasize that casual person-to-person contact, as among schoolchildren, appears to
pose no risk to others, thus infected children should be allowed to attend regular classes if an
evaluation of the case finds none of the aforementioned manifestations to be present. Due to the
virus' detrimental effect on a child's immunological system, the party at greatest risk in a school
environment is the AIDS-infected child. As the AIDS-infected child's ability tocombat infection
decreases, the child runs a greater risk of suffering severe complications from infections such as
chicken pox, cytomegalovirus, tuberculosis, herpes simplex and measles. The CDC guidelines
state that "for most infected school-aged children, the benefits of an unrestricted setting would
outweigh the risks of their acquiring potentially harmful infections in the setting and the ap-
parent nonexistent risk of transmission of the (AIDS virus)." See Education and Foster Care,
supra note 23, at 519.
40. See Tarr, supra note 27, at 11; Education and Foster Care, supra note 23, at 519.
41. The National Education Association guidelines express the view that schools ought to be em-
powered to require tests to screen students and workers for exposure to AIDS when the school
has "reasonable cause" to suspect infection. The organization felt "reasonable cause" exists
where a spouse of a school employee has AIDS, or a school employee gives birth to a child with
AIDS. The guidelines do not require disclosure of sexual orientation, nor could sexual orienta-
tion be a grounds for testing, absent other factors. The guidelines also urge the use of a case-by-
case analysis, confidentiality, and alternative instruction be provided by the school where a child
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Control guidelines in some form and are allowing infected children into
regular classes,42 others have declined to do so." The concern for non-
infected students' health and safety is understandable, but the refusal by
some school districts to allow students with AIDS to attend regular public
school classes raises legal questions regarding the applicability of the four-
teenth amendment due process and equal protection provisions, as well as
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.
THE RIGHT TO EDUCATION
The Supreme Court has declined to hold that publicly financed primary
and secondary education constitutes a fundamental right. In San Antonio
Independent School District v. Rodriguez44 the Court emphasized that a
fundamental right is a specific, judicially defined civil liberty that courts
will find to be present only when explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the
Constitution. Because education is not a fundamental right under the
is removed from regular classes due to infection. See New Guidelines Issued by NEA On
Teachers, Students with AIDS, AIDS Policy & Law (BNA) No. 13, at 1 (July 16, 1986).
42. Swansea, Mass., became the nation's first school district to allow children with AIDS to attend
regular classes. The student in question, a 12-year-old boy, had contracted the disease from con-
taminated blood products used in the treatment of his hemophilia. Unlike the citywide panic that
broke out in the Queens section of New York when a child with AIDS was admitted, the Swansea
decision did not generate picketing, protests or threats. See infra note 43 and accompanying text.
See also Is School for All?, A.B.A. J., Nov. 1985, at 18-19; Tarr, AIDS Victims Face Bias, Too,
NAT'L L.J., Sept. 16, 1985, at 30. Additionally, school districts in Indiana, Kansas, Minnesota,
New Jersey and New York have decided to allow infected students to attend regular classes. See
Six Children Admitted In New York, AIDS Policy & Law (BNA) No. 17, at 5 (Sept. 10, 1986);
In Brief, AIDS Policy & Law (BNA) No. 16, at 6 (Aug. 27, 1986); New Jersey Child To Attend
Class, AIDS Policy & Law (BNA) No. 14, at 4 (July 30, 1986); In Brief, AIDS Policy & Law
(BNA) No. 11, at 6 (June 18, 1986).
43. School districts in California, Colorado, Connecticut, the District of Columbia, Florida, In-
diana, New Jersey, New York and Virginia have barred AIDS-infected children from regular
classes. One student whose plight has attracted widespread attention is 13-year-old Ryan White
of Kokomo, Ind., who, in December 1984, was diagnosed as having AIDS, contracted from con-
taminated blood products used in the treatment of hemophilia. He was promptly banned from
attending regular classes by Kokomo's Western School Corporation, over the objection of
Ryan's doctor, the Centers for Disease Control and Indiana state health officials, who had
adopted guidelines similar to those issued by the Centers for Disease Control. Ryan missed the
remainder of his sixth-grade school year. See Tarr, supra note 27, at 29. Ryan has since returned
to school, thanks to favorable court decisions. The citizenry who so vehemently opposed his
return to the classroom have directed their efforts to the creation of a legislative ban on students
with AIDS attending regular classes. In Brief, AIDS Policy & Law (BNA) No. 16, p. 6 (Aug. 27,
1986).
44. 411 U.S. 1 (1973). The Court upheld the use of local property taxes to finance a public school
system in Texas, even though the funding method allowed disparities in the amount spent per
student to exist within the school district. The plaintiffs had argued that this disparity, caused by
the differing levels of affluence of the respective residents, constituted an equal protection viola-
tion. The Court declined to apply the strici scrutiny standard (under which an action will not be
upheld unless it is necessary to promote a constitutionally compelling end), holding it was arguably
reasonable for the Legislature to utilize local property taxes to provide for local educational needs.
The Court found no substantial and direct correlation between the amount expended for educa-
tional matfrials and instruction, and the quality of education received. Id. at 35.
45. 411 U.S. at 33-34.
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Constitution, the responsibility for providing a public system of education
falls upon the states."6
Traditionally, public education was considered a privilege bestowed
upon an individual. As a privilege, it could be withdrawn or restricted by
the state on the basis of race, religion, handicap or other grounds, with no
requirement that just cause be shown. 7 This policy changed in 1954 when
the Supreme Court held in Brown v. Board of Education4 1 that school
segregation on the basis of race violated the fourteenth amendment. In
Brown, the Court altered the ability of states to place restrictions on
public education. The Court held that when a state undertakes to provide
public education, it must make it available to everyone on an equal basis. 9
This was the Court's first indication that it would apply the equal protec-
tion and due process guarantees to public education.
While it has refused to find that education constitutes a fundamental
right, the Court has acknowledged a property interest in it when a state
undertakes to provide public education.5 0 The willingness to acknowledge
this interest stemmed from the Court's development of a fourteenth
amendment property right in some government-provided services." In
46. Forty-eight states make some provision for education in their constitutions. See Ratner, A New.
Legal Duty for Urban Schools: Effective Education in Basic Skills, 63 TEx. L. REV. 777, 814-16
(1985). The degree of emphasis and importance that various state constitutions attach to educa-
tion ranges from establishing only a general requirement as to the provision of education, to mak-
ing it a paramount duty of the state to provide the greatest amount of education possible. See id.
at 814-22. State legislatures have the power to create school systems or to delegate such creative
authority to local authorities. Such authority extends to system financing, age restrictions ap-
plicable to students, length of school sessions, and the qualifications, duties, and wages of per-
sonnel. See E. REUTTERI JR. AND R. HAMILTON, THE LAW OF PUBLIC EDUCATION 87 (1976). State
legislators can take any action they desire regarding education, so long as the action does not
violate the federal Constitution. See generally Campbell, An Analysis of Provisions of State
Constitutions Affecting Financial Support of Public Schools, in LEGAL ISSUES IN EDUCATION,
(E. Bolmeir ed. 1970).
47. Referred to as the "right/privilege dichotomy," the Court distinguished between state and
federal government-provided services and individual rights grounded in constitutional or com-
mon law. Any privileges granted by the government could be withdrawn without the use of a
hearing or other procedural protection. Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1950),
aff'd by an equally divided Court, 341 U.S. 918 (1951). See, e.g., McAuliffe v. Mayor of New
Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 29 N.E. 517 (1982); Gonzales v. Freeman, 118 U.S. App. D.C. 180, 334
F.2d 570 (1964); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 374; Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618,
627 n.6; Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563, 568.
48. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
49. Id. at 493.
50. The willingness to make this concession has come from the Court's development of a fourteenth
amendment property right in some government-provided services in a line of cases beginning
with Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). In Mills v. Board of Education, 348 F. Supp. 866
(1972), the United States District Court for the District of Columbia held that no child eligible to
receive a public education can be excluded from receiving one unless adequate alternative educa-
tional services suited to their needs are provided, as well as a prior hearing on the action to be
taken. Id. at 878. See also Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania (343
F. Supp. 279 (1972)).
51. In a line of cases beginning with Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), the Court moved away
from its previous position that government-provided services were privileges that could be
restricted or withdrawn at the whim of the provider, with little or no requirement that reasonable
criteria or procedures be utilized. In Goldberg, the Court stated that the question of whether due
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Goss v. Lopez, 2 the Court struck down an Ohio statute allowing local
school authorities to impose short-term suspensions on students. In find-
ing an improper deprivation of property, the Court determined that the
combination of a system of free public education and the enactment of
compulsory education laws created an entitlement on the part of the stu-
dent to a public education. 3 The Court also held that where such a prop-
erty interest arises, fourteenth amendment protections guard against its ar-
bitrary or unreasonable removal.1
4
RESTRICTION OF ACCESS TO EDUCATION
The Scope of State Regulatory Authority
Once created, the property right of a child to attend public schools re-
mains subject to reasonable regulation.55 It has long been recognized that
a state can protect the health, safety and welfare of citizens by means of
legislation promulgated and enforced pursuant to the police power, im-
pliedly granted to the states by the tenth amendment.5" This police power
process protections apply is determined based on the importance of the benefit to the individual.
Where the benefits are significant, and the harms from removal constitute a "grievous loss," the
property interest the individual has in the benefit dictates that fourteenth amendment protec-
tions apply. Id. at 262-63. The Court followed up on this property right theory in Board of
Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972), and Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972), where the
Court adopted the position that the existence of a protected property right will be found only
where there is an entitlement to a benefit under state law. In determining whether the party is en-
titled to the benefit, courts look to the effect and intent of local law and whether a claim to the
benefit is created. If entitlement is found to exist, the government granting the property interest
cannot destroy or substantially alter it without affording the party reasonable notice and a
chance to voice objections, as required by the due process clause. In both cases the Court deter-
mined that entitlement arises where the federal, state, or local law governing the dispensing of a
benefit defines that benefit in such a way that the person enjoying it is eligible to receive it, and
has a continuing eligibility and reliance interest in receiving it.
52. 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
53. Compulsory education laws have been enacted to require all minors of school age to spend a
minimum set number of hours and days each year in school buildings. Although such a restric-
tion infringes on the individual's right to freedom of movement and association, this infringe-
ment has been viewed as justified by the importance of the motive of compulsory education
laws. See Ratner, A New Legal Duty for Urban Schools: Effective Education in Basic Skills, 63
TEX. L. REV. 777, 823-24 (1985).
54. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 573-74 (1975).
55. Id. at 581.
56. The tenth amendment reads: "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitu-
tion, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."
U.S. CONST. amend. X. The Court has interpreted this to create a "police power" by which the
states can control intrastate functions that the federal government has not been granted author-
ity over. The concept of a state's "police power" was first expressed by Chief Justice Marshall in
Gibbons v. Ogden, where he alluded to "[t]he acknowledged power of a State to regulate its
police, its domestic trade, and to govern its own citizens." 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 208 (1824). The
roots of the police power concept thus lie in early confrontations between state and federal
government regarding the regulation of commerce. The theory soon began to assert itself as a
source of authority under which a state could, as is the case today, enact and enforce legislation
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can be used to safeguard public health, even at the expense of individual
rights, so long as the state has a reasonable basis for doing so." Where a
regulation is found to be reasonable, the court will defer to local or state
authorities. 8
When balancing individual rights against a state's use of police power
to protect public health, courts have traditionally applied a rational basis
test, under which the court presumes the regulation to be valid and defers
to the state's authority unless the regulation bears no reasonable relation-
ship to a legitimate state interest, or is arbitrary, capricious or
unreasonable.5 9 Courts have, however, determined "rational basis" to be
too low a standard of review for cases involving the deprivation of a public
education, due to its importance to the individual and society.60
In Plyier v. Doe,6 the Court struck down a Texas statute permitting
school authorities to refuse to enroll the children of illegal aliens in public
schools. In holding that the law violated the equal protection clause of the
to protect and promote the health, safety, morals, order and general welfare of the state. In
Willson v. The Black Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245 (1929), decided five years after
Marshall first mentioned police power in Gibbons, the Court upheld a Delaware police power ac-
tion involving the damming of a navigable waterway in order to protect the health of nearby
residents. See also Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25-26 (1905).
57. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25-26 (1905); Hartman v. May, 168 Miss. 477, 151 So.
737 (1934). See also infra note 68 and accompanying text.
58. Hartman v. May, 168 Miss. 477, 151 So. 737 (1934); Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174 (1922); Von-
negut v. Baun, 206 Ind. 172, 188 N.E. 677 (1934); Mathews v. Kalamazoo Board of Education,
127 Mich. 530, 86 N.W. 1036 (1901); Kenney v. Gurley, 208 Ala. 623, 95 So. 34 (1923); Nutt v.
Board of Education, 128 Kan. 507, 278 P. 1065 (1929); Bright v. Beard, 132 Minn. 375, 157
N.W. 501 (1916); Barsky v. Board of Regents, 347 U.S. 442 (1954).
59. Under the "rational basis" standard, courts will not review legislative decisions, and will defer
to the legislature's judgment, so long as the action conceivably bears a rational relationship to a
governmental end not prohibited by the Constitution. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW ch. 13 § IV; L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 15-2, § 16-2, §
16-3, § 16-6 (1978). When reviewing regulations designed to protect the public health, it has been
suggested that courts examine the law in light of the following considerations:
1. Does the state have a duty to protect the public health? 2. Is that duty a legitimate
legislative subject? 3. Does the health statute under consideration bear a rational and
direct relationship to the objective? 4. Is the statute arbitrary or capricious? 5. If
legislative classification results, is that classification rationally related to a legitimate state
interest? 6. Does the sweep of the statute go beyond what is required to achieve the objec-
tive? 7. Is either a suspect classification or a fundamental right involved?
Damme, Controlling Genetic Disease Through Law, 15 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 801, 805 (1982).
60. As the Supreme Court has stated:
Today education is perhaps the most important function of state and local governments.
Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures for education both
demonstrate our recognition of the importance of education to our democratic society. It
is required in the performance of our most basic public responsibilities, even service in the
armed forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a principle instru-
ment in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional
training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment. In these days, it is
doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the
opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to pro-
vide it, is a right which must be made available to all on equal terms.
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
61. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
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fourteenth amendment, the Court emphasized that education was of
special importance to an individual's development.6 2 By stating that public
education provides the primary means by which a child learns the values
and structure of our political system and society, the Court seemed to be
flirting with the possibility of education constituting a fundamental right
where its denial runs the risk of hampering an individual's ability to com-
prehend, participate in and function in our society and political system.
63
Based on the importance of the benefit denied and the powerlessness of
the group excluded in such controversies, the Court determined that
education warranted different treatment than other government-provided
services, and an intermediate, or heightened, level of review should be ap-
plied where the deprivation of public education 6 4 or a quasi-suspect class is
involved. 65 Under this intermediate level, falling between strict scrutiny
and rational basis, the court will uphold a statute if the classification
utilized by the legislature serves important governmental objectives and is
substantially related to their achievement.
66
The Supreme Court noted in Jacobson v. Massachusetts67 that the
rights of individuals may be restrained where there exists a public necessi-
ty. Such a regulation must, however, deal with that necessity reasonably,
infringe on individual rights as minimally as the situation will permit, and
not be exercised in an arbitrary or oppressive manner.68 Since Jacobson,
62. The Court stated:
Public education is not a "right" granted to individuals by the Constitution. But neither
is it merely some governmental "benefit" indistinguishable from other forms of social
welfare legislation. Both the importance of education in maintaining our basic institu-
tions, and the lasting impact of its deprivation on the life of the child, mark the distinc-
tion. . . . [E]ducation provides the basic tools by which indiviuals might lead economi-
cally productive lives to the benefit of us all. In sum, education has a fundamental role in
maintaining the fabric of our society. We cannot ignore the significant social costs borne
by our Nation when select groups are denied the means to absorb the values and skills
upon which our social order rests.
Id. at 221.
63. Id. at 221.
64. Id. at 219-22, 230.
65. The possibility of an intermediate level of scrutiny was first broached in Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S.
71 (1971), where the Court first indicated it would no longer examine gender-based discrimina-
tion cases under the rational basis test. The Court solidified this attitude in Craig v. Boren, 429
U.S. 190 (1976), where the Court stated that "[t]o withstand constitutional challenge . ..
classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantial-
ly related to achievement of those objectives." Id. at 197.
66. See supra notes 44, 59-60 and accompanying text.
67. 197 U.S. 11 (1905). In Jacobson, health authorities in Cambridge, Massachusetts, enacted a law
making vaccination for smallpox mandatory in response to the increase of smallpox in the city
and its believed transmissability. Jacobson refused to comply, claiming an invasion of personal
liberty and a lack of evidence of a need for the law. Id. at 29. The Court rejected these claims,
citing medical authority to the contrary, the public's past experience with the disease, its severity
and the rise in the occurrence of the disease in the area. Id. at 26, 28-31.
68. Id. at 26-27, 28-31. The Court quoted its opinion in Crowley v. Christensen, 137 U.S. 86, 89
(1890), where the Court stated that "[t]he possession and enjoyment of all rights are subject to
such reasonable conditions as may be deemed by the governing authority of the country essential
to the safety, health, peace, good order and morals of the community. Even liberty itself, the
greatest of all rights, is not unrestricted license to act according to one's own will. It is only
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courts have upheld vaccination requirements as prerequisites to admission
to public schools, even where no epidemic or immediate threat of an out-
break was present.69 The regulation, however, must be justified when
reviewed in light of medical evidence. This is an objective medical question
answered, where a disease is involved, by looking at the severity of the
disease and the manner and likelihood of its transmission. 7 These factors
will determine whether the regulation is necessary and, if so, how broad
the regulation should be. 1
AIDS As a Basis for Restricting Access
In the context of a regulation prohibiting school attendance by pupils
with AIDS, the questions for a court are whether the exclusion of the class
in question (AIDS-infected children) serves an important governmental
objective (prevention of the spread of contagious disease) and whether the
means are substantially related to the governmental objective. The protec-
tion of public health within a school district or state is recognized as an im-
portant governmental objective, whether dealt with by state or school
district authorities.72 Courts and legislatures have recognized the power of
school authorities to prescribe health measures as a condition for school
attendance in order to deal with a potential health threat.73 When a threat
is reasonably perceived, such regulations have been deemed not to run
afoul of statutory or constitutional provisions protecting the property
right to education, so long as the means chosen substantially relate to the
governmental objective.
freedom from restraint under conditions essential to the equal enjoyment of the same right by
others. It is then liberty regulated by the law." 197 U.S. at 26-27.
69. In Hartman v. May, 168 Miss. 477, 151 So. 737 (1934), the Mississippi Supreme Court upheld
such a vaccination requirement on the grounds that, although smallpox was not present, the
dangerous and contagious nature of the disease made the law a reasonable step to safeguard
public health. Based on increased medical knowledge and faith in the vaccine, the court accepted
the notion that regulations directed at preventing the introduction, as well as the spread, of con-
tagious diseases was neither arbitrary nor unreasonable. See also People v. Robertson, 302 III.
422, 134 N.E. 815, 817-18 (1922).
70. Under current court procedures, when confronted with the task of reviewing a health regulation,
a court will first determine whether there exists an actual or potential need for it. In Jacobson,
the Court considered both medical and lay opinion in arriving at a decision. The subsequent
trend has been to place great weight on medical evidence and testimony when making evalua-
tions as to the existence of a health risk. This increased reliance on medical experts can be seen in
the willingness of courts to allow state and local health authorities to decide on the necessity for
regulation and corresponding scope and form of that regulation. In People v. Robertson, the
Supreme Court of Illinois indicated that the state health authorities were empowered to isolate
individuals and enact regulations where they have a reasonable belief that a threat exists, and the
power of such authorities will be liberally construed. 302 Il1. 422; 134 N.E. 815, 817-19 (1922).
71. In Jacobson, the Court stated that when faced with a health concern a community might enact
protective regulations that, in the course of protecting the general public, go beyond the realm of
necessity and affect certain persons in an arbitrary and unreasonable manner. A regulation of
this type would be invalid as an impermissible and excessive use of police power. 197 U.S. at 28.
72. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
73. Id.
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The governmental objective of school authorities prohibiting AIDS-
infected students from attending regular classes has been alleged to be the
prevention of the disease's transmission. This is an important governmen-
tal objective, so long as an appreciable, medically recognized potential for
transmission exists in the environment to be regulated. Absent an actual
threat, exclusionary actions become open to question where they deny the
child equal protection of the law.
The Threat of AIDS Transmission in the Classroom
The success or failure of an AIDS-infected child's equal protection
argument will depend on whether the regulation is justified by a threat of
transmission of the disease in an educational setting. The answer lies in the
ease and ability of the disease to be transmitted by casual contact. Based
on current medical evidence, there is no risk of transmission of the AIDS
virus in a classroom setting or other circumstances involving casual con-
tact."'
Although AIDS poses a new and unique problem in that it is transmiss-
ible, fatal and presently incurable, it is not the first disease to surface in
public schools. The medical community points out that AIDS has much in
common with hepatitis B, or serum hepatitis, and much that has been
learned about the hepatitis B virus can be applied to understanding the
risk of transmission of the AIDS virus.7" Hepatitis B, like HTLV-III, can
be transmitted through sexual contact, exposure to contaminated blood or
blood products, drug abuse and prenatal transmission from infected
mother to children.76 Moreover, neither has been shown to be transmiss-
ible through casual contact, nor through contaminated food or water.7"
Hepatitis B differs, however, in that it is hardier and more infectious than
the HTLV-III virus.78
Confronted with children carrying the hepatitis B virus, school boards
have in the past enacted regulations prohibiting infected children from at-
tending regular classes. In New York State Association for Retarded
Children v. Carey,79 a New York school board prohibited certain retarded
children who were carriers of the hepatitis B virus from attending regular
classes for fear the disease would spread to other students. The Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit held the regulation invalid in light of the
board of education's failure to demonstrate that the health hazard posed
by the hepatitis B carrier children was anything more than a remote
74. See supra notes 12-26 and accompanying text.
75. See Transmission in the Workplace, supra note 19, at 681-82.
76. See id.
77. See id. at 683.
78. See id. at 681.
79. 612 F.2d 644 (2d Cir. 1979).
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possibility.8" The court also held that excluding or isolating the infected
students would constitute a violation of their rights under the Rehabilita-
tion Act of 1973.8"
A regulaton directed at protecting a legitimate state interest, such as
public health, can infringe upon and limit the entitlement to education if
that regulation is based upon an actual threat.8 2 Such a regulation cannot
be premised on irrational panic and groundless fear. The first major deci-
sion on the ability to exclude an AIDS-infected child from a public school
is District 27 Community School Board v. Board of Education.3 In 1985,
the New York City Health Department received a copy of the CDC's
recommendations on the education and care of children infected with the
AIDS virus. 4 Based on that and other information, the city announced it
would adhere to a policy of not automatically excluding infected children
from public schools. Instead it relied on a case-by-case analysis to deter-
mine the child's ability to remain in a regular classroom. 5 This policy
drew strong opposition from some citizens and, when it was announced
that a seven-year-old child with AIDS would be allowed to attend regular
classes, a suit was brought seeking to enjoin the admission of the child or,
alternatively, to have his or her identity revealed. 6 The petitioners in
District 27 alleged that city law required the commissioner of health and
chancellor of the board of education to exclude any children infected with
AIDS under a provision of the New York City Public Health Code that
prohibited "the intentional or negligent spread of disease by persons who
are cases or carriers of communicable disease.''87
In upholding the city's policy, the Supreme Court for Queens County,
after extensive medical testimony, pointed out that "the experts
unanimously agree that the virus is not transmitted by casual interpersonal
contact or airborne spread, such as breathing, sneezing, coughing, shak-
ing hands or hugging." 88 The court also noted the absence of documented
incidences of the virus being contracted through casual contact in a
80. Id. at 650-61.
81. Id. at 649-51. Such a violation occurs whenever an individual is excluded, solely on the basis of a
handicap, from participation in, denied the benefits of, or subjected to discrimination under any
program or activity receiving federal assistance. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794
(1982). Recent court decisions such as School Board v. Arline, __ U.S. __, 94 L. Ed. 2d 307
(1987); E.D. Black, Ltd. v. Marshall, 497 F. Supp. 1088 (D. Hawaii 1980), and District 27 Com-
munity School Board v. Board of Education, 130 Misc. 2d 398, 502 N.Y.S.2d 325 (Sup. Ct.
1986) have interpreted the statutory langauge of the Rehabilitation Act to include diseases such
as hepatitis B and AIDS as statutory handicaps for purposes of the Act's protective provisions.
82. For example, a regulation preventing children not vaccinated for smallpox from attending
school is valid where there is an appreciable potential for transmission in an educational setting.
Conversely, a regulation banning attendance by children with leukemia would not be valid.
83. 130 Misc. 2d 398, 502 N.Y.S.2d 325 (Sup. Ct. 1986).
84. Education and Foster Care, supra note 23, at 519.
85. 130 Misc. 2d at 400-01, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 328.
86. Id. at 401, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 328.
87. Id. at 408-10, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 332-34.
88. Id. at 404-05, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 330-31.
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school, home or similar setting, and the extreme unlikelihood of it being
possible to contract the disease from a bite or the mixing of blood in a
fight.8 9 Based on "the apparent nonexistent risk of transmission of
HTLV-III/LAV in the school setting," the court held that the city's policy
of not automatically excluding infected children was not arbitrary,
capricious nor an abuse of discretion, and should stand." Additionally,
the court held that in light of the medical evidence, a policy that
automatically excluded children with AIDS from the classroom would
violate their rights under the Federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and their
rights to equal protection of the law. 9'
RISK OF AIDS TRANSMISSION VS. NEED
FOR SOCIALIZATION
The court in District 27 took note of an additional consideration to be
weighed in favor of keeping an infected child in a regular classroom when
possible-the importance of a group education environment to an in-
dividual's social, intellectual and psychological well-being.2 It has been
the general view of the courts, legislators and sociologists that it is
desirable to keep a student in a regular classroom setting whenever poss-
ible. Such considerations arise where, as in pediatric AIDS cases, educa-
tional authorities seek to exclude a student from the classroom and
establish an alternative educational setting. Sociologists emphasize the im-
portance of keeping students in the regular classroom and allowing them
to interact with others. It is generally agreed that a child's social environ-
ment greatly affects the development of personality.93 A way by which
students acquire the motives, values, knowledge and behavior patterns
needed for functioning in adult society is through the socialization ex-
perienced in schools through contact with peers.9 '
In Mills v. Board of Education of District of Columbia,95 a federal
89. Id. at 405-07, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 330-32.
90. Id. at 413, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 335.
91. Id. at 413-14, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 335-36.
92. Id. at 413-14, 502 N.Y.S.2d 337.
93. As one commentator notes:
Nature has ordained that man cannot prosper in isolation. Social experience, with its
companionship, its challenge, and its motivation assures an individual the opportunity
for civilized living and the capacity for assuming social responsibility. The child must be
oriented and inducted into this pattern of life. Acquisition of manners and morals, use of
communication, utilization of institutions for his own welfare and the group welfare con-
tribute to his developing personal-social relationships and responsibilities. By adopting
patterns of his group, the individual receives the approval of his fellows and thereby
achieves a feeling of belongingness. These two are basic dynamic needs which can be
achieved only through group living.
C. MILLARD, CHILD GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT 208 (1951).
94. Reohr, Friendship: An Important Part of Education, EDUC. DIGEST 31-33 (Feb. 1985).
95. 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.C.D.C. 1972).
[Vol. 14:87
Aids in the Classroom
district court established a right to access to education where a state under-
took to provide it. 96 A child could not be excluded for improper reasons,
and where legitimate reasons existed, the state must provide an adequate
alternative educational program geared to that child's needs." Although
such educational alternatives can be justified, many legislators and
sociologists agree with the Mills court view that such alternatives are in-
adequate. 9s
The Supreme Court has recognized the important role education and
the classroom plays in socialization. In Goss v. Lopez, 99 the Court
established that a student has liberty interests that are also protected by
due process.100 The Court's concern centered on the potential for damage
to a student's associational relationships with fellow students and
teachers, and the long-term effects on the educational and employment
opportunities of the student that an administrative removal from school
could precipitate.'1 Because of the gravity of the property interest at stake
and the harm a student could potentially suffer from a suspension, the
Court determined that procedural protections were necessary in order to
assure that any disciplinary actions taken are warranted and reasonable,
and the student must be given notice of allegations, as well as an oppor-
tunity to be heard.' 0 In Brown v. Board of Education,103 the landmark
case ordering an end to racial segregation and the use of the "separate but
equal" doctrine, the Court recognized that intangibles, such as peer con-
tact and educational atmosphere, were as important to the educational
process as such tangibles as books and buildings."0 4
In the context of children with AIDS, the potential for infringement of
liberty through damage to name, reputation and future education and
employment is typified by the picketing of schools, job discrimination and
social outcasting caused by the public's fear of individuals with AIDS. 105
The stigma attached to the disease can have permanent and serious impact
on the infected party.'0 6
96. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
97. 348 F. Supp. at 878-79.
98. See C. MILLARD, supra note 93, at 375-78.
99. 419 U.S. 565 (1974).
100. Id. at 574-76.
101. Id. at 574-75.
102. Id. at 574-76.
103. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
104. The use of "separate but equal" facilities was held to be inherently inequal due to the fact that
segregation of students based on race, or arguably any unalterable characteristic, "generates a
feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in
a way unlikely ever to be undone." Id. at 492-94.
105. See supra notes 24, 42-43 and accompanying text.
106. The damage would most likely be the result of the emotional trauma of being shunned, and from
the lack of contact with peers. See supra notes 93-94 and 97-101 and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION
According to constitutional, statutory and judicial mandate, a pro-
tected property right to public education exists. Although this right is sub-
ject to modification or loss, any restriction must be reasonable and
grounded on facts clearly evidencing a need for restriction. Even where
such a restriction is valid, the party denied the benefit must be afforded
fourteenth amendment protections.
In the context of pediatric AIDS, the vast majority of cases lack the re-
quisite justification. A restriction on a child's access to the classroom
based on the presence of AIDS should be justifiable only if it is shown that
there exists a risk of the disease being transmitted in the classroom setting.
In the absence of any discernible risk of transmission, as adjudged by
medical standards, infected children should be permitted to attend regular
public school classes. Those children who pose a significant risk of
transmission-due to the presence of habitual biting, lack of control of
bodily functions, or the presence of open lesions-should be excluded, as
the CDC guidelines advise.
To detect those children posing a risk, guidelines similar to those pro-
posed by the Centers for Disease Control should be added on a state-by-
state basis to state health laws and education regulations. 107 By codifying
such guidelines and establishing a state review board comprised of
educators, medical personnel and parents, a state would be able to con-
duct a case-by-case analysis of an infected child's medical and educational
circumstances in order to arrive at a rational, medically sound determina-
tion as to any risk posed by the child's inclusion in a regular classroom.
It is the Centers for Disease Control's recommendation that the review
board consist of the child's doctor, a parent or guardian, public health
personnel and representatives of the school involved. The board would be
charged with reviewing the child's physical, neurological and behavioral
development, as well as the type and amount of interpersonal interaction
likely to occur in the educational setting. All considerations would be
weighed in light of existing medical knowledge, not extraneous or un-
founded public fear. Furthermore, the diverse makeup of the board would
ensure that competing concerns would be heard.
The CDC guidelines have been drafted by medical experts and recom-
mended by the National Education Association. The guidelines offer the
most comprehensive and advantageous proposal by which to protect the
public, while providing education to all who have the right and ability to
receive it.
Stephen M. Price*
107. The applicable provisions of the CDC's proposed guidelines are reprinted in the appendix to this
note.
* B.A., Michigan State University, 1984; J.D. Candidate, Notre Dame Law School, 1987.
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APPENDIX
The provisions of the Centers for Disease Control's recommended guidelines
for the care of infected children which are applicable to educational settings are:
1. Decisions regarding the type of educational and care setting for HTLV-
III/LAV-infected children should be based on the behavior, neurologic develop-
ment, and physical condition of the child and the expected type of interaction
with others in that setting. These decisions are best made using the team approach
including the child's physician, public health personnel, the child's parent or
guardian, and personnel associated with the proposed care or educational setting.
In each case, risks and benefits to both the infected child and to others in the set-
ting should be weighed.
2. For most infected school-aged children, the benefits of an unrestricted set-
ting would outweigh the risks of their acquiring potentially harmful infections in
the setting and the apparent nonexistent risk of transmission of HTLV-III/LAV.
These children should be allowed to attend school and after-school day-care and
to be placed in a foster home in an unrestricted setting.
3. For the infected preschool-aged child and for some neurologically han-
dicapped children who lack control of their body secretions or who display
behavior, such as biting, and those children who have uncoverable, oozing le-
sions, a more restricted environment is advisable until more is known about
transmission in these settings. Children infected with HTLV-III/LAV should be
cared for and educated in settings that minimize exposure of other children to
blood or body fluids.
6. The hygienic practices of children with HTLV-III/LAV infection may im-
prove as the child matures. Alternatively, the hygienic practices may deteriorate if
the child's condition worsens. Evaluation to assess the need for a restricted en-
vironment should be performed regularly.
9. Mandatory screening as a condition for school entry is not warranted based
on available -data.
10. Persons involved in the care and education of HTLV-III/LAV-infected
children should respect the child's right to privacy, including maintaining con-
fidential records. The number of personnel who are aware of the child's condi-
tion should be kept at a minimum needed to assure proper care of the child and to
detect situations where the potential for transmission may increase (e.g., bleeding
injury).
11. All educational and public health departments, regardless of whether
HTLV-III/LAV-infected children are involved, are strongly encouraged to in-
form parents, children, and educators regarding HTLV-III/LAV and its
transmission. Such education would greatly assist efforts to provide the best care
and education for infected children while minimizing the risk of transmission to
others.
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